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This paper examines how the level of democracy in a country affects the relationship
between fiscal decentralization and government size. We argue that political regimes,
proxied by their democracy levels, are important for different decentralization theories to
predict the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size. We test this argument
using cross-country data from 76 developed and developing countries during 1972–2013.
We find strong and robust evidence that fiscal decentralization is negatively associated
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impact of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, our study contributes to the literature by
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1. Introduction
During the past decades, numerous countries worldwide, both developed and
developing countries, have undergone decentralization in terms of their fiscal, political,
and administrative structures. The growing interest for this topic in academic research
has triggered intense discussions on its various aspects, especially the consequences of
fiscal decentralization. To date, the literature has identified a wide range of potential
impacts of fiscal decentralization on a country, including economic growth, regional
disparity, macroeconomic stability, corruption, and government size (see MartinezVazquez et al., 2017 for a survey). Among them, one of the most relevant and discussed
consequences is the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size, for which
limited consensus has been reached, both theoretically and empirically (Golem, 2010).
This paper re-examines empirically the effect of fiscal decentralization on
government size by considering the role of a country’s political regime (proxied by
democracy). We contribute to the literature by offering a novel explanation on the
mixed results regarding the relationship between fiscal decentralization and
government size in the literature. Theoretically, fiscal decentralization, as explained in
the subsequent section, has important implications on government size, although
competing explanations exist. Specifically, by assuming the government as a
benevolent agent that serves the needs of its constituents, the “first-generation” of fiscal
federalism argues that, in the presence of heterogeneous preferences and needs across
different jurisdictions, fiscal decentralization may increase the efficiency and quality of
government services because it allows for a closer match between the preferences of
residents and the packages of public goods and services provided by local governments
(Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972; Weingast, 2009). Therefore, greater decentralization can
be considered to enhance local accountability and residents’ trust in government, which
motivates them to demand more public goods and services, hence leading to a greater
government size (Golem, 2010). By assuming the government as a monolithic
Leviathan, with selfish public officials to maximize revenues, as opposed to the
benevolent government assumed in the previous literature, the “second-generation” of
fiscal federalism argues that, for attracting/maintaining mobile tax bases (i.e., residents
6

and firms), tax competition among governments under the decentralized system
destroys the Leviathan’s monopoly on taxation and brings government spending closer
to the preferences of residents, thus potentially leading to less bureaucratic waste of
resources and a smaller size for government spending (Weingast, 2009; Golem, 2010).
Therefore, these different predictions for the relationship between fiscal
decentralization and government size are based, at least partially, on the particular
political regimes that give rise to different government types. We argue that, compared
to non-democratic regimes, democratic regimes are more likely to support a benevolent
government, meaning fiscal decentralization in democratic countries is more likely to
improve local accountability, resulting in a relatively larger government size. We test
this hypothesis using a cross-country dataset of 76 developed and developing countries
for the period 1972–2013. We find strong evidence that (1) overall, fiscal
decentralization is negatively associated with government size, supporting
decentralization as a device to promote local competition thus restricting government
size increases, and (2) fiscal decentralization in countries with a higher level of
democracy tends to have a smaller negative impact on government size than countries
with lower democracy levels. We thus contribute to the literature by providing an
explanation that integrates the apparently conflicting views on the relationship between
fiscal decentralization and government size. These results are robust across alternative
measures of key variables and alternative specifications, data frames, and estimation
approaches.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature and discusses the potential role of democracy in the nexus between fiscal
decentralization and government size. Section 3 proposes the empirical methodology
and discusses the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 provides
additional robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2. Literature Review
2.1. Fiscal decentralization and government size
The literature of fiscal federalism has long discussed the impact of fiscal
decentralization on government size. Particularly, two different viewpoints dominate
the literature, both empirically controversial. The first viewpoint originates from the
traditional theory of fiscal federalism, the so-called “first-generation” of fiscal
federalism, which draws heavily from the seminal work of Tiebout (1956), Musgrave
(1959), and Oates (1972), among others. In this literature stream, governments are
assumed to act benevolently in the interest of residents, who are in turn assumed to be
able to move freely to jurisdictions best suiting their preferences. Therefore, the
devolution of tax and expenditure authority under a decentralized system improves the
efficiency of public goods provision because decentralization leads to information
advantages and, in the presence of heterogeneous preferences, allows local
governments to response more flexibly to the needs and preferences of their residents.
The resulting increases in local accountability and residents’ trust in the government
further motivate residents to demand more public goods and services, hence leading to
an expansion in government size. In other words, with the presumption of government
benevolence and resident mobility, government size is determined by the demand for
government expenditure, while decentralization helps stimulate demand.
Apart from the demand-side explanation of the impact of fiscal decentralization
on government size, the development of fiscal federalism literature, the so-called
“second-generation” of fiscal federalism, introduces a supply-side explanation, which
results in an opposite prediction of the impact of fiscal decentralization on government
size. Specifically, by abandoning the assumption of a benevolent government, this
literature stream assumes the government to be selfish, depicted as a monolithic
Leviathan that seeks to maximize revenues and expand its scale through excessive
taxation, deficit, and money generation (Weingast, 2009; Golem, 2010). Therefore, a
centralized system, compared to a decentralized one, makes the government easier to
conceal and follow its selfish interests, while leaving less constraining power to
8

taxpayers or citizens to control such a large government. In this case, the
decentralization of taxation and spending power is argued to be a potentially effective
way to constrain an unreasonable expansion of the government because
decentralization may trigger an inter-jurisdictional competition for mobile tax bases
(i.e., firms and residents), meaning any attempt by a local jurisdiction to abuse taxation
and/or spending will result in the relocation of its tax bases to an alternative jurisdiction.
Owing to this competitive pressure, each local jurisdiction tends to reduce its tax
burden, which consequently affects the supply of local public goods and services. In an
extreme case, the fierce tax competition under a decentralized economy may even result
in the so-called “race to the bottom” phenomenon, characterized by an inefficiently low
tax rate and, hence, a reduced government size (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986;
Wilson, 1986, 1999; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004).
Empirically, numerous studies investigate the relationship between fiscal
decentralization and government size using different datasets, time frames, and
econometric methods, but no consensus seems to have been hitherto reached. In an
early stage, Oates (1985), Nelson (1986), Marlow (1988), and Forbes and Zampelli
(1989) made pioneering contributions to this research area. Oates (1985) uses a sample
of 48 US contiguous states and 43 developed and developing countries and fails to find
a significant Leviathan effect. By using US state and county data, respectively, Nelson
(1986) and Forbes and Zampelli (1989) do not find significant results in support of the
Leviathan hypothesis either. Nevertheless, Marlow (1988) identifies a negative and
significant impact of expenditure decentralization, measured by the ratio of state and
local government spending to total government spending, on government size by using
US national-level data for the period 1946–1985. Grossman (1989) reports the same
finding as those of Marlow (1988) and further emphasizes that intergovernmental grants
increase government size due to the moral hazard behaviors of local governments.
Recent research showed increasing attention to cross-country datasets. For
instance, Ehdaie (1994) uses two cross-country datasets for two different years and
finds an insignificant effect of fiscal decentralization on government size. Stein (1999)
9

explores a Latin American country dataset with a special focus on intergovernmental
transfers and finds vertical fiscal imbalance and borrowing autonomy tend to increase
government size. Jin and Zou (2002) provide a more detailed classification of different
government levels, and find that fiscal decentralization reduces the size of the national
government but increases the sizes of sub-national governments, overall increasing the
size of governments. Rodden (2003) investigates a panel dataset covering 19 OECD
countries from 1985 to 1995, and suggests that a smaller government size corresponds
to a decentralized system where local governments are primarily financed by local tax
revenues instead of intergovernmental grants. Based on a large cross-country dataset
and using the total number of public-sector employees as a measure of government size,
Martinez-Vazquez and Yao (2009) find that, ceteris paribus, a country’s government
size increases with its level of fiscal decentralization. Particularly, while fiscal
decentralization decreases central government employment, it is more than fully offset
by the increases in employment at the subnational level that accompany
decentralization.
2.2. Why does democracy matter?
As previously discussed, the nexus between fiscal decentralization and government size
is neither theoretically definitive nor empirically clear. We argue an increased focus
needs to be placed on the relevance of political regimes, since they have strong
implications for the functioning of different theories and thus condition the relationship
between fiscal decentralization and government size. Particularly, the traditional theory
of fiscal federalism, which predicts a larger government size in decentralized
economies assumes: (i) the presence of a benevolent government that is responsive and
accountable for the preferences and needs of local residents and (ii) the mobility of
residents

reinforcing

inter-jurisdictional

competition

and

enhancing

local

accountability, since residents can vote “with their feet” and arrange themselves into
homogeneous communities, where their preferences are maximized. Under these
assumptions, it seems unlikely the aforementioned prediction of the traditional theory
of fiscal federalism will hold if no democratic institutions exist. Specifically, given a
10

mature democracy, the various monitoring mechanisms, such as elections and press
freedom, may function well, which is essential to guarantee the existence of a
benevolent government that acts in the interest of residents (Karlström, 2015). Further,
to ensure inter-jurisdictional competition as an effective mechanism to improve local
accountability, there must be institutions supporting the free mobility of residents
across jurisdictions, so that residents are able to vote with their feet, and free
information should flow to residents and firms, so that they can compare policy
outcomes and government quality in their home jurisdiction with those of other
jurisdictions. Unfortunately, these freedoms are typically restricted in many nondemocratic or authoritarian countries (Beyani, 2000). Consequently, the prediction of
the traditional theory of fiscal federalism for a larger government size is more likely to
occur in countries with democratic institutions. We thus hypothesize that the level of
democracy may condition the relationship between decentralization and government
size. As such, by exploring the role of democracy, we also offer another explanation
for the inconsistent results in the empirical literature on the relationship between fiscal
decentralization and government size.
3. Empirical Strategy and Data
3.1. Econometric specification
We investigate the effect of fiscal decentralization on government size, with a particular
focus on the role of democracy. To achieve this purpose, we estimate the following
fixed effects model:
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 +
𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,
(1)
where the dependent variable (i.e., 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 ) represents the government size of
country i in year t. 𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 is the fiscal decentralization indicator of the country and is
lagged by one period to avoid the potential endogeneity issue. 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 is a lagged
democracy index. 𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 is the interaction term between the two
variables, being a key variable. Based on the previous theoretical illustration, we expect
11

to find a positive sign for coefficient 𝛿, implying that with the increase in the democratic
level of a country, fiscal decentralization is more likely to result in a larger government
size. 𝜇𝑖 is the time-invariant and country-specific effect of country i; 𝜑𝑡 is a set of year
dummies, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the i.i.d. error term.
Regarding the control variable 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 , we seek to capture the general
determinants of government size based on the empirical literature. These include real
GDP per capita, share of the secondary sector in total GDP, trade openness,
urbanization rate, and demographic variables. Real GDP per capita (in log form) and
the share of the secondary sector in total GDP stand for the economic development
level of the country. It has long been argued that economic development generally leads
to a simultaneous increase in the demand for more and better public services (e.g.,
Wagner, 1893; Akitoby et al., 2006; Wu and Lin, 2012). Trade openness is typically
believed to lead to a larger government size, as voters seek insurance against external
shocks when the country is exposed to international trade (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik,
1998). However, a competing view is that openness restrains government size by
imposing balance of payments constraints, thus reducing the power of domestic special
interests (Ferris et al., 2008). As such, we include trade openness, measured as the ratio
of total trade (exports and imports) to GDP, to control for this effect. Additionally, the
urbanization rate can be presumed to determine government consumption and
investment (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998), and we capture this effect by measuring it as
the share of urban population to total population. Finally, the relative size of the nonworking population may matter for the level of public expenditure because a younger
population demands more education services, while the elderly require more health
care. Therefore, we might hypothesize that governments will be larger in countries
where the non-working population represents a greater percentage of the total
population. We thus follow Rodden (2003) and others in capturing this factor through
two variables—the proportion of individuals aged 0–14 and of those aged 65 and above.
All control variables are lagged by one period to avoid any bias due to the concern of
reverse causality.
12

3.2. Data
The panel dataset we used covers 76 developed and developing countries during 1972–
2013.2 The variables are derived from a wide range of sources. Our measure of
government size, as the ratio of total general government expenditure to the GDP, is
obtained from the World Development Indicators database. This measure of
government size is a traditional one in the literature (see, for example, Stein, 1999; Jin
and Zou, 2002; Rodden, 2003; Kotera et al., 2012).
Measuring the extent of fiscal decentralization has been long debated in both
theoretical and empirical studies largely because fiscal decentralization happens along
several dimensions and at different paces. Therefore, no single indicator can adequately
capture the full picture of this process, which would ideally be measured separately for
each dimension (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003; Stegarescu, 2005).
Nevertheless, this issue can be at least partially overcome by considering alternative
indicators that reflect the different aspects of the decentralization process (Liu et al.,
2017). Consequently, we measure a country’s fiscal decentralization by simultaneously
considering both expenditure and revenue. Of these two indicators, expenditure
decentralization, defined as the ratio of state and local government spending to total
general government spending, has been most widely used in the literature (e.g., Oates,
1985; Davoodi and Zou, 1998; de Mello, 2000), as it captures the degree of local
governments’ expenditure responsibilities in the public sector, that is, it quantifies who
does what. Therefore, we rely on expenditure decentralization as our primary measure
of fiscal decentralization and utilize revenue decentralization as an alternative measure
of fiscal decentralization to verify the robustness of our results. The data for both
measures of fiscal decentralization are obtained from the World Bank’s
Decentralization Indicator database, which calculates the indexes based on raw data
from the Government Finance Statistics of the International Monetary Fund.

2

The list of countries in our sample is provided in Table A1 in the Appendix.
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Democracy, another key variable of interest, is a relative concept that reflects the
degree of civil liberties and political rights across countries. We construct it by using
the average of political rights and civil liberties provided by the Freedom House. 3
However, it is rescaled to take values from 0 to 10, with larger values signifying a more
democratic regime. All other economic variables are derived from the World
Development Indicator database. Variable definitions are presented in Table A2 in the
Appendix and summary statistics are reported in Table 1.
4. Main Empirical Results
Table 2 presents the estimation results for baseline model (1), where fiscal
decentralization is measured through its expenditure. All specifications are estimated
using a fixed effects model.
To begin with, we examine the net effect of fiscal decentralization on government
size without considering the role of democracy. Columns (1) and (2) respectively report
the results controlling or not for year fixed effects in the estimations. The coefficient of
expenditure decentralization is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in
both columns, suggesting an increase of fiscal decentralization leads to a smaller
government size. This finding lends support to the prediction of the “secondgeneration” of fiscal federalism, which presumes the existence of a Leviathan-type
government, meaning decentralization tends to restrict the growth in government
spending by encouraging an inter-jurisdictional tax competition. Quantitatively, taking
Column (2) as reference, the estimated net effect of the expenditure decentralization is
-0.069, implying a one percentage point increase in expenditure decentralization
reduces government size (i.e., total government expenditure as a percent of GDP) by
0.069 percentage points.

3

In the Freedom House index, both “political rights” and “civil liberties” range from 1 (most free) to 7

(least free). The indicators for political rights include an effective election system of public institutions,
political party pluralism, fair elections and voting rights, and the decentralization of political power.
The indicators of civil liberties include the public freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and
demonstration, doing trade, as well as social and economic rights of the individual.
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However, the estimates in Columns (1) and (2) may not be precise. This is because,
as illustrated in Section 2, the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size may
depend on the political regime in which the decentralization system operates.
Particularly, the level of democracy in a country may act as a significant and direct
determinant of the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size. Thus, we
consider the interaction effect between fiscal decentralization and democracy. This
interaction term allows us to evaluate how the democracy level in a country influences
the effect of fiscal decentralization on government size. Columns (3) and (4) provide
the results for when the interaction term between fiscal decentralization and democracy
is added. As predicted, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term is significantly
positive, implying the negative effect of fiscal decentralization on government size is
diminishing with the increase of a country’s democracy level. This result is largely
consistent with our previous theoretical demonstration that democracy may condition
the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size, particularly the
prediction of the traditional theory of fiscal federalism that a larger government size is
more likely in countries with democratic institutions.
While the results above are informative, they remain somewhat limited as they do
not directly indicate the net partial impact of fiscal decentralization on government size
or whether fiscal decentralization has a statistically significant impact on government
size when the democracy level of a country does not equal 0.4 Therefore, based on
Column (4) of Table 2, we illustrate in Figure 1 the marginal effect of fiscal
decentralization on government size across the observed range of democracy levels.
The solid sloping line indicates how the marginal effect of fiscal decentralization
changes as the level of democracy of a country increases, while the two dashed lines,
representing 95% confidence intervals, allow us to determine the conditions under
which fiscal decentralization has a statistically significant effect on government size—

4

In specifications with interaction terms, the statistical significance of an individual variable does not necessarily

imply its marginal effect is statistically significant (see Brambor et al., 2006).
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the net effect of fiscal decentralization is significant whenever the upper and lower
bounds of the confidence interval are both below 0. As per Figure 1, the partial effect
of fiscal decentralization is strictly negative and statistically significant through the
entire range of democracy. Nevertheless, the increase in the democracy level clearly
indicates the negative effect of fiscal equalization is diminishing.
Regarding the other control variables, the results are mostly consistent with our
prediction. Real GDP per capita has positive and significant coefficients, supporting
Wagner’s law in that economic development leads to a larger demand of public goods
and services. Trade openness contributes to a smaller government size, indicating
openness may restraint government size by imposing balance of payments constraints.
The proportion of the younger population is positively associated with government size,
reflecting the special needs of government services from this group. The estimates for
other control variables are generally statistically insignificant.
5. Robustness Checks
To test the robustness of the main results, we conduct sensitivity analyses along three
dimensions: using alternative measures of the key variables, that is, fiscal
decentralization, government size, and democracy; using an alternative data structure;
and using an alternative specification addressing the endogeneity concern of fiscal
decentralization. In all robustness checks, we find results from the specifications
equivalent to those in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.
5.1. Alternative measures of key variables
We first use alternative measures for the key variables. Instead of measuring
decentralization from the expenditure side, we consider its revenue side, which may
reflect different aspects of the fiscal decentralization process. Specifically, we measure
revenue decentralization as the ratio of state and local government revenue to total
general government revenue and re-estimate specification (1). The estimated results are
reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3. The estimated coefficient of revenue
decentralization remains negative and statistically significant and its interaction term
16

with democracy remains significantly positive. Moreover, the quantitative effects of
revenue decentralization are also similar to those of expenditure decentralization in
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2. Second, we conduct the estimations using another
proxy for government size—total employment in the public sector (in log form)—
which is another popular measure of government size in the literature (see, for example,
Martinez-Vazquez and Yao, 2009). The estimated results are shown in Columns (3)
and (4) of Table 3, with expenditure decentralization being negatively and significantly
associated with the new measure of government size. The interaction term between
expenditure decentralization and democracy is positive and statistically significant at
the margin in Column (3) of Table 3. However, it is also statistically significant in
Column (4) of Table 3, when year fixed effects are controlled for.
Further, we use an alternative democracy index to perform robustness checks.
That is, the index of political democracy and autocracy derived from the Polity IV
Project dataset, which ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly
democratic). The variable is a combination of three independent elements of
institutionalized democracy: (i) presence of institutions and procedures through which
citizens can express effective preferences about alternative politicians and leaders, (ii)
existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive, and
(iii) guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily life and for acts of political
participation. Because of its comprehensiveness in measuring democracy, this variable
has also been frequently used in the literature (e.g., Swamy et al., 2001; Gatti, 2004).
Therefore, we use it as an alternative democracy measure and re-estimate the model.
The estimated results are documented in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3, according to
which expenditure decentralization has a negative impact on government size, while
the democracy level of a country tends to mitigate this negative impact.
5.2. Alternative data structure
To further verify the robustness of the results, we alternatively explore a different data
structure. Particularly, since we may not expect a year-on-year change between fiscal
17

decentralization and government size because the latter variable is likely to be affected
by short-run business cycles and the level of democracy in a country is generally stable
for long periods of time, focusing on the average values of our variables may help
reduce the short-run fluctuations and allow us to examine the long-run relationship
between fiscal decentralization and government size and how it varies across different
democracy levels. Consequently, we re-estimate specification (1) by transforming
yearly data into 5-year intervals (i.e., 1972–1974, 1975–1979, …, 2005–2009, 2010–
2013) and 10-year intervals (i.e., 1972–1979, 1980–1989, 1990–1999, 2000–2009,
2010–2013). The results are reported in Table 4 and are largely unchanged compared
to the baseline results in Table 2, with only the estimated coefficient of the interaction
term being quantitatively larger. Therefore, our baseline results seem not to be affected
by the short-run business cycle and the potential measurement errors.
5.3. Addressing the endogeneity concern
An important concern in estimating specification (1) is that of potential endogeneity for
a country’s fiscal decentralization. Theoretically, this issue may arise because of reverse
causality, omitted variable bias, or measurement errors. Although we have tried to
mitigate this issue to a large extent in the previous estimations, namely taking oneperiod lags of all explanatory variables and utilizing alternative measures of key
variables and data frames, the endogeneity issue may still be of concern. Previous
studies on the impacts of fiscal decentralization have also acknowledged the potential
endogeneity bias in their estimates, although they do not explicitly control for it,5 to a
large extent due to small sample sizes and lack of adequate instruments (e.g., Zhang
and Zou, 1998; Jin et al., 2005; Qiao et al., 2008). Here, we account for the potential
endogeneity issue of fiscal decentralization more explicitly by using an instrumental
variable approach. The instruments we use include one- and two-period lagged values
of the weighted average of fiscal decentralization from neighboring countries (weighed

5

Fisman and Gatti (2002) and Iimi (2005) are the two exceptions in the literature.
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by the contiguity matrix6). The validity of this instrument is justified by the design of
fiscal decentralization policy in a country being possibly correlated with the design of
decentralization policies in neighboring countries because of their geographical
similarity and potential competitive and mimicking behaviors, while the government
size of a country should have virtually no direct impact on the design of the fiscal
decentralization of neighboring countries in the preceding years.
Table 5 documents the results of the instrumental variable method, where fiscal
decentralization is treated as an endogenous variable. For all specifications, the Fstatistics are close to or above 10, which suggests the relevancy of our instruments is
indeed strong. Additionally, the Hansen J Statistic of over-identification restriction in
Table 5 is in almost all cases above 0.10, implying we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of no correlation between the instruments and error term in the regressions.
Comparing the results in Tables 5 and 2 confirms our earlier findings: fiscal
decentralization leads to a smaller government size, while the democracy level of a
country helps reduce the negative effect of fiscal decentralization on government size.
Further, the parameter estimates in Table 5 are quantitatively larger than those in Table
2, potentially suggesting the endogeneity issue may lead to under-estimated effects of
fiscal decentralization and democracy in the baseline estimations.
6. Concluding Remarks
The impact of fiscal decentralization on government size has been discussed in great
depth in the literature, but limited consensus has been reached either theoretically or
empirically. To explain the mixed results in the literature, we investigate the extent to
which the level of democracy determines the effect of fiscal decentralization on
government size. We hypothesize fiscal decentralization is more likely to result in a
larger government size in a country with a higher democracy level, where a benevolent
government is more likely to exist and local officers are more likely to be accountable

6

That is, a value of 1 is assigned if two countries share the same border, and 0 otherwise. The

underlying assumption is that geographically closer countries interact more strongly in policy settings.
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for the needs of local residents. By contrast, fiscal decentralization is more likely to
result in a smaller government size in a country with a lower democracy level, where a
Leviathan-type government is more likely to exist and decentralization tends to restrain
government size by fostering inter-jurisdictional competition.
We then confront this theoretical prediction with the results from a crosscountry dataset covering 76 developed and developing countries over 1972–2013. We
find supporting evidence that an increase in the fiscal decentralization of a country
reduces the government size and the negative impact of fiscal decentralization tends to
be weakened in countries with higher democracy levels. These results are robust across
alternative measures of key variables, alternative data frames, and specifications
correcting for the endogeneity of fiscal decentralization.
The results are both academically and policy-wise relevant. Academically, they
contribute to a better understanding of the nexus between fiscal decentralization and
government size in the literature. By focusing on the role of democracy, we highlight
the specific conditions for the potential conflicting predictions of different
decentralization theories. Consequently, by introducing the determining effect of the
democracy level, our study thus potentially explains the mixed results in the empirical
literature on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size. From
the policy perspective, fiscal decentralization has been advocated by many
organizations, such as the World Bank, for different reasons. Our results suggest that
fiscal decentralization may be used to address the inefficient expansion of government
size in countries without democratic institutions, where decentralization encourages
inter-jurisdictional competition for mobile tax bases, thus restraining the inefficient use
of government resources.
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Figure 1. Marginal Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Government Size
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Note: this figure is illustrated based on the results of Column (4) in Table 2. Solid lines represent
the estimated marginal effect of fiscal decentralization on government size. Dashed lines represent
confidence interval based on 95% confidence level for individual coefficients.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable
Government size, primary
Government size, alternative
Expenditure decentralization
Revenue decentralization
Democracy 1
Democracy 2
GDP per capita (log)
Secondary industry (%)
Openness (%)
Urbanization (%)
Young population (%)
Elderly population (%)
IV: Weighted expenditure decentralization

Obs.
1,484
679
1,615
1,643
1,660
1,630
1,660
1,372
1,656
1,695
1,695
1,695
1,294

Mean
29.14
6.57
25.31
26.73
8.14
6.73
9.32
31.39
76.32
66.08
24.40
10.98
28.09

Std. Dev
12.17
1.52
17.91
16.06
2.67
5.49
1.35
7.49
44.58
18.57
8.74
4.76
13.97

Min
1.88
3.40
0.02
0.43
0.50
-10.00
5.43
12.47
4.92
9.17
13.23
2.21
0.56

Max
97.80
10.55
98.76
98.76
10.00
10.00
11.63
72.15
343.56
97.69
49.86
23.16
98.04

Note: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 2. Main Empirical Results
Expenditure decentralization, t-1

(1)
-0.065***
(0.017)

(2)
-0.069***
(0.017)

2.937**
(1.319)
-0.021
(0.049)
-0.069***
(0.012)
-0.110
(0.079)
0.232**
(0.103)
-0.241
(0.239)

(3)
-0.193***
(0.041)
0.018***
(0.005)
-0.639***
(0.169)
7.142***
(1.060)
-0.162***
(0.048)
-0.060***
(0.011)
0.066
(0.067)
0.218**
(0.107)
-0.070
(0.231)

(4)
-0.207***
(0.044)
0.019***
(0.005)
-0.631***
(0.171)
4.072***
(1.337)
-0.089*
(0.052)
-0.070***
(0.012)
-0.117
(0.079)
0.316***
(0.113)
-0.274
(0.238)

6.212***
(1.042)
-0.095**
(0.045)
-0.058***
(0.012)
0.059
(0.067)
0.155
(0.100)
-0.025
(0.232)
Yes
No
1,187
0.064

Yes
Yes
1,187
0.120

Yes
No
1,176
0.082

Yes
Yes
1,176
0.138

Expenditure decentralization
*Democracy 1, t-1
Democracy 1, t-1
GDP per capita, t-1
Secondary industry, t-1
Openness, t-1
Urbanization, t-1
Young population, t-1
Elderly population, t-1

Country Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect
Observations
R-squared

Note: The dependent variable is the primary measure of government size. Standard error in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3. Robustness Checks: Alternative Measurement of Key Variables

Revenue
decentralization, t-1
Revenue decentralization
*Democracy 1, t-1

Revenue
decentralization
(1)
(2)
0.182***
0.211***
(0.039)
(0.041)
0.022***
0.025***
(0.005)
(0.005)

Expenditure decentralization, t-1
Expenditure
decentralization
*Democracy 1, t-1
Democracy 1, t-1

0.778***
(0.172)

0.792***
(0.176)

Government size,
alternative
(3)
(4)

-0.005*
(0.003)

-0.007**
(0.003)

0.000
(0.000)

0.001**
(0.000)

-0.005
(0.014)

-0.021
(0.014)

Expenditure
decentralization
*Democracy 2, t-1

Secondary industry, t-1

Openness, t-1
Urbanization, t-1
Young population, t-1

Elderly population, t-1

(5)

(6)

-0.096***
(0.018)

0.095***
(0.018)

0.007***
(0.002)

Democracy 2, t-1
GDP per capita, t-1

Democracy 2

7.161***
(1.031)
0.134***
(0.046)
0.061***
(0.011)
0.075
(0.065)
0.190**
(0.095)

4.418***
(1.286)

0.115**
(0.058)

-0.061
(0.051)
0.071***
(0.012)
-0.118
(0.078)
0.313***
(0.099)

-0.008***
(0.002)

-0.094
(0.227)

-0.267
(0.234)

-0.016**
(0.008)

-0.001***
(0.000)
0.020***
(0.003)
0.003
(0.007)

-0.015
(0.065)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.010***
(0.004)
0.009
(0.007)
0.029***
(0.008)

-0.184***
(0.040)

0.007***
(0.002)
0.430***
(0.062)
2.613**
(1.078)
0.130***
(0.042)

0.003
(0.010)
-0.014
(0.055)
0.043
(0.088)

0.007
(0.011)
-0.139**
(0.063)
0.061
(0.091)

-0.410***
(0.062)
4.356***
(0.878)

0.049
-0.036
(0.191)
(0.193)
4.356***
2.613**
Country Fixed Effect
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effect
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Observations
1,201
1,201
647
647
1,155
1,155
R-squared
0.083
0.144
0.114
0.172
0.105
0.196
Note: The dependent variable in Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) is the primary measure of government size, while the
dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is the alternative measure of government size. Standard error in
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4. Robustness Checks: Alternative Data Structure
5-year Intervals
(1)
(2)
Expenditure decentralization, t-1
-0.217*** -0.231***
(0.079)
(0.088)
Expenditure decentralization
0.028**
0.029**
*Democracy 1, t-1
(0.012)
(0.013)
Democracy 1, t-1
-0.886**
-0.881**
(0.372)
(0.387)
GDP per capita, t-1
6.536***
6.789**
(2.484)
(3.215)
Secondary industry, t-1
-0.192*
-0.205*
(0.099)
(0.108)
Openness, t-1
-0.022
-0.024
(0.029)
(0.031)
Urbanization, t-1
-0.156
-0.105
(0.130)
(0.161)
Young population, t-1
-0.074
-0.035
(0.220)
(0.245)
Elderly population, t-1
0.047
-0.031
(0.529)
(0.550)
Country Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect
Observations
R-squared

Yes
No
245
0.113

Yes
Yes
245
0.125

10-year Intervals
(3)
(4)
-0.151
-0.223*
(0.104)
(0.116)
0.029* 0.037**
(0.016)
(0.018)
-0.434
-0.346
(0.476)
(0.490)
2.363
4.730
(3.713)
(5.041)
-0.068
-0.141
(0.148)
(0.173)
0.030
0.020
(0.036)
(0.039)
-0.038
-0.000
(0.148)
(0.181)
0.064
0.266
(0.285)
(0.321)
0.497
0.301
(0.574)
(0.603)
Yes
No
245
0.154

Yes
Yes
245
0.164

Note: The dependent variable is the primary measure of government size. In the estimations of Columns
(1) and (2), we transform the yearly data into 5-year intervals (i.e., 1972-1974; 1975-1979;…; 20052009; 2010-2013); in the estimations of Columns (3) and (4), we transform the yearly data into 10-year
intervals (i.e., 1972-1979; 1980-1989; 1990-1999; 2000-2009; 2010-2013). Standard error in
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5. Robustness Checks: IV Estimations
(1)
Expenditure decentralization, t-1
-0.598***
(0.179)
Expenditure decentralization
*Democracy 1, t-1
Democracy 1, t-1
GDP per capita, t-1
Secondary industry, t-1
Openness, t-1
Urbanization, t-1
Young population, t-1
Elderly population, t-1

Country Fixed Effect
Year Fixed Effect
Observations
R-squared
IV F-stat
Sargan P-values

(2)
-0.663***
(0.187)

0.492
(1.146)
-0.410***
(0.061)
0.0004
(0.013)
-0.046
(0.064)
-0.376***
(0.146)
0.398
(0.244)

-6.586***
(1.718)
-0.240***
(0.055)
-0.002
(0.011)
-0.385***
(0.086)
-0.323**
(0.154)
0.181
(0.223)

(3)
-1.132**
(0.460)
0.094*
(0.049)
-1.581**
(0.717)
-0.883
(1.237)
-0.403***
(0.057)
-0.003
(0.011)
-0.018
(0.058)
-0.516***
(0.110)
0.173
(0.191)

Yes
No
926
0.068
9.59
0.1713

Yes
Yes
926
0.138
8.48
0.3046

Yes
No
918
0.214
23.57
0.0948

(4)
-1.374***
(0.463)
0.119**
(0.049)
-1.679**
(0.720)
-6.401***
(1.520)
-0.272***
(0.057)
0.008
(0.011)
-0.288***
(0.064)
-0.518***
(0.108)
-0.009
(0.189)
Yes
Yes
918
0.309
20.44
0.1863

Note: The dependent variable is the primary measure of government size. The instruments are oneperiod and two-period lagged values of the weighted average of fiscal decentralization from the
neighboring countries (weighed by the contiguity matrix). Standard error in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix
Table A1. The List of Countries used in the Sample
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Albania
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belgium
Bulgaria
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Belarus
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Switzerland
Chile
Congo, Rep.
Colombia
Cabo Verde
Costa Rica
Cyprus

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Czech Republic
Germany
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Spain
Estonia
Finland
France
United Kingdom
Georgia
Greece
Honduras
Croatia
Hungary
India
Ireland
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Iceland
Israel
Italy

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Jamaica
Jordan
Japan
Kazakhstan
Korea, Rep.
Lesotho
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Latvia
Morocco
Moldova
Mexico
Macedonia, FYR
Malta
Mongolia
Mauritius
Malaysia
Netherlands
Norway
New Zealand

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Peru
Poland
Portugal
Paraguay
Russian Federation
El Salvador
Serbia
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Sweden
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Ukraine
United States
South Africa
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Table A2. Description of Variables and Sources
Variable
Definition
Government size, primary
Share of total government expenditure
to GDP, %
Government size,
alternative

Total public sector employment, log

Expenditure
decentralization

Ratio of subnational government
expenditure to the total general
government expenditure, %
Ratio of subnational government
revenue to the total general
government revenue, %
Average of political right index and
civil liberties index. It is rescaled to
take values between 0 and 10, with the
larger value signifying a more

Revenue decentralization
Democracy 1

Democracy 2
GDP per capita, log
Secondary industry
Openness
Urban
Young population
Elderly population
IV: Weighted fiscal
decentralization

democratic regime
The index of political democracy
and autocracy
Real GDP per capita (1985 fixed
price), log
Share of secondary sector in total
GDP, %
Ratio of total trade (exports and
imports) to GDP, %
Share of urban population in the total
population, %
Share of young population (ages 0-14)
in total population, %
Share of young population (ages 65
and above) in total population, %
The weighted average of fiscal
decentralization from the neighboring
countries (weighted by the contiguity
matrix)

Source
World
Development
Indicators (WDI)
database
The International
Labor Organization
database
World Bank’s
Decentralization
Indicator database
World Bank’s
Decentralization
Indicator database
Freedom House

The Polity IV
Project dataset
WDI
WDI
WDI
WDI
WDI
WDI
Authors’
calculations
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